Quality is currently the dominant policy theme in the National Health Service (NHS) in England. The most important policy document of 2008 was High Quality Care for All. 1 It is the most prominent of recent documents aimed both at pulling and at pushing the NHS to improve its quality of care. What is new in recent policy in England is to link improvements in patients' health outcomes to financial incentives.
One of the principal raisons d'être of any health service is to improve the health of the population. So the most important -though far from the onlymeasures of health service quality are the outcomes achieved for patients. The most relevant assessment of those outcomes will usually (with obvious exceptions) be the patient's view of the change in their quality of life, combined with research evidence of the likely impact on length of life.
The Department of Health in England has embraced this logic and added to it a belief in the power of financial incentives. Its approach, 'Commissioning for Quality and Innovation' (CQUIN), is intended to engender a culture where quality improvement is second nature to all involved. At its heart is a financial incentive. By April 2010 providers of NHS care will have a small fraction of their income determined by the outcomes they achieve.
The 152 local bodies in the NHS in England that are responsible for purchasing health care for their resident populations, called Primary Care Trusts, are expected to make 0.5% of the total value of their payments to health care providers available for CQUIN incentive payments. Payments are to be directly linked to locally agreed indicators of health care quality, including measures of patient outcomes. 2,3 This is in the context of a health care system in which patients are free to choose their hospital and where hospitals are mostly paid according to the number and case-mix of patients treated. 4, 5 Financial incentives to achieve quality improvements have been used for some years now, in the UK as well as internationally. In the UK, they were first introduced for primary care. Since 2004, under the 'Quality and Outcomes Framework' of the nationally negotiated contract with primary care physicians, general practices receive around 20% of their income in the form of payments based on their standards of care. 6 Payments generally relate to process measures such as increased percentages of patients receiving flu vaccinations or assessments for high blood pressure. Some payments relate to intermediate outcomes such as the proportion of patients with coronary heart disease who have a 'normal' level of cholesterol.
In October 2008, the North West region of the NHS introduced a programme -'Advancing Quality' -of payment for performance for its hospitals, based on the US Premier model. 7 This pays the top two deciles of performers a small premium on their contract prices: an additional 2% for the top 10% of performers and 1% for the second 10%. It also plans to add penalties of a reduction of 2% for the lowest 10% of performers and 1% for the second lowest 10%. The performance indicators, which currently cover aspects of cardiac care, hip replacement and knee replacement, mainly refer to processes of care but do include inpatient mortality rates. Patient reported outcome measures (PROMs) will also be included from October 2009. 7 A recent review of published evaluations of financial incentives directed at improving the quality of hospital care concluded that: 'The published research to date in this area is too limited to draw conclusions with confidence'. 8 More recent studies have continued to find either no, or only modest, positive impacts on various indicators of quality. 9 -11 Under CQUIN, a mere 0.5% of revenue is to be subject to achievement of measured quality improvements. This may appear timid but the fact that some of these payments are to be linked to the achievement of improvements in patients' outcomes, makes the approach look bold. However, two concerns need to be addressed: linking pay to patient outcomes and the range of treatments to which such incentive payments will apply.
Since April 2009, NHS hospitals in England providing elective hip and knee replacements, varicose vein surgery and groin hernia surgery have been required to collect patient reported outcomes which include the generic EQ-5D measure of health status. 3 CQUIN payment schemes include these measures. A hospital that achieves better patient outcomes will receive more money. But it will require more than one year of experience to allow providers, patients and purchasers to come to trust the evidence. Glitches will need to be ironed out and risk adjustments refined to allow for inherent variations in outcomes between different patient populations. A more cautious approach might be wiser, using perhaps the first three years to reward the collection and use of outcomes measures rather than to reward outcomes per se.
The focus so far on just four, albeit common, surgical procedures for the collection of patient reported outcomes, looks too narrow. These procedures accounted for just 1.5% of the nearly 15 million patient episodes in NHS hospitals in England in 2006-2007 financial year. Outcomes could be collected in a much wider range of therapeutic areas, as was demonstrated by the Office of Health Economics Commission in its March 2008 report. 12 Based on a review of outcome measures in use in research for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, colorectal cancer and mental health, the Commission recommended collection of patient reported outcomes as soon as possible in a wide range of other treatment areas. It suggested that by the end of 2012-2013 financial year routine measures of patient outcomes in terms of patient survival and quality of life should be collected for the majority of health care activity.
The NHS in England is undertaking a major experiment with financial incentives for higher quality care. The speed with which it is intended to start linking payments to measured patient outcomes is startling. More time could be well spent preparing the ground by incentivising collection and analysis of outcome data so as to improve the quality of the data. By contrast, the initial focus on collecting PROMs for just four groups of surgical procedures is unnecessarily narrow. Expansion to other areas of treatment is required. But the boldness of attempting to pay health care providers according to the health improvements is admirable. This experiment needs to be properly and fully evaluated, starting now. 
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